Friday, November 30, 2012

DLA Demands Chip Makers Tag Products With Plant DNA; A War On Counterfeiters


This November, the Defense Logistics Agency will require companies selling microcircuits to the military to stamp their products with an unlikely seal of authenticity: plant DNA.

It's an innovative initiative in the fight against counterfeit computer chips, which has been a major concern in the Senate, but it's only one piece of the answer. DLA plans to put out a formal Request For Information sometime this month to ask industry to offer other, complementary authenticity-checking technologies, and Congress is watching closely.

"This and programs like it may be good long-term solutions to the problem, but additional steps are necessary to address the short-term problem," said one congressional source, discussing the DNA marking technology with AOL Government affiliate, AOL Defense.

While markers of authenticity are well and good, the source explained, when Congress addressed counterfeit components in Section 818 of last year's National Defense Authorization Act, "the law went way beyond this; it requires them to change the way that they do business. The implementing regs to Section 818 are really the crux of what needs to be done, and they haven't been issued yet."

Vice Adm. Mark Harnitchek, the director of the Defense Logistics Agency, has touted a four-part plan to combat counterfeiting: testing components already in hand, buying from original manufacturers or their authorized distributors wherever possible, using anomaly-checking software to spot suspect transactions, and, finally, requiring microcircuits to be tagged with DNA.

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The brilliance of DNA tagging is that it's inexpensive, widely applicable, and virtually unhackable, at least according to its inventors. "We stand by the strongest claim in the industry, which is our DNA cannot be copied," said James Hayward, the molecular biologist and bio-physicist who heads Applied DNA Sciences. That's company named in the Defense Logistics Agency mandate as the only authorized purveyor of the marking technology, at least for now.

Hayward's firm starts with natural plant DNA. Then they engineer it -- the process is a trade secret -- to create unique strands of genetic code, which in various formulations can be mixed with ink used to mark products or directly infused into materials used to make them like sillicon, plastic, wire, or textiles.

The technology is already widely used in bank notes in Europe, where it has helped convict more than 30 counterfeiters. Applied DNA is even experimenting with ways to "tag" diesel fuel. Once the DNA is embedded in the product, by whatever means, you detect it with a swab test, or you can shine a CSI-style black light (provided by Applied DNA) onto the tag: If it reflects a particular wavelength, it's authentic. (Other, more time-consuming tests give greater detail).

The downside -- that aforementioned "short-term problem" -- is DNA tagging does nothing about all the components already out there that were not tagged at the moment of manufacture. Those chips are now often in the hands of secondary-market distributors, many of whom got them from still other distributors rather than from the original manufacturer, which may no longer exist.

It is parts bought on this byzantine secondary market, not those directly from manufacturers and their authorized dealers, that are sometimes not what their packaging says they are. Sure, a distributor can tag its inventory, and that will help trace the parts back to that distributor later if there's any question, but doing so says nothing about the original provenance of the parts.

It will take years for tagged components to become commonplace in the secondary market. In the meantime the military must keep buying untagged chips because so many of its systems are so old that the original manufacturer has stopped making components or gone out of business altogether, forcing DLA to scrounge for spart parts wherever it can.

"10 years from now if all parts are implanted with DNA or they're all traceable back to the manufacturer with a unique identifier, that's great and this problem may be significantly reduced in scope," the congressional source explained, "but any part produced prior to today and any part that's produced outside of this requirement may not be marked."

The DLA mandate that takes effect in November applies to "manufacturers, franchised distributors and other distributors [on DLA's] Qualified Suppliers List," according to an agency factsheet. But the Defense Department is no longer the dominant buyer in the microelectronics market, and companies mas-producing chips for iPhones or airbags may see no need to add a step to their manufacturing process -- however easy Hayward says it is -- just to keep selling to the military.

"The Department of Defense can't define the market for what gets done on commercial chips because they're such a small customer," said the congressional source, "so are commercial manufacturers going to do this for the defense market?"

That's a business case Hayward and company must make far beyond the Department of Defense. Given rising concerns about counterfeit components and cybersecurity in the commercial world, not just the military, they have a real shot. Certainly the DLA seal of approval will help them sell their seals of authenticity to civilian markets.

Thursday, November 1, 2012

Lockheed Martin develops new Cu solder - ElectroIQ

Lockheed Martin develops new Cu solder - ElectroIQ:

October 26. 2012 - Lockheed Martin scientists have developed a new "nanotechnology" copper-based solder that it says will produce joints with up to 10× the electrical and thermal conductivity of today's tin-based materials.

The principal lead-free replacement for solders is a combination of tin, silver, and copper that is fine for mostly short product life cycles and benign operating environments. However, requiring higher processing temperatures translates into higher costs; the high tin content causes problems with "tin whiskers," needle-like crystals of metal that grow on tin-finished surfaces that potentially cause current leakage and shorting; and more rugged operating environments common in a number of end-use applications (military/aerospace, medical, oil/gas, automotive) lead to more fractures and impact reliability. 

"To address these concerns, we realized a fundamentally new approach was needed to solve the lead-free solder challenge," explains Alfred Zinn, materials scientist at the Advanced Materials and Nanosystems directorate (ATC) at Lockheed Martin's Space Systems Advanced Technology Center in Palo Alto, CA.

His invention is a solder paste dubbed "CuantumFuse" that addresses several primary criteria: sufficiently small nanoparticle size and reasonable size distribution, reaction scalability, low cost synthesis, oxidation and growth resistance at ambient conditions, and robust particle fusion when subjected to elevated temperature. Copper was chosen because its existing ubiquity as a material for trace, interconnects, and pads minimizes compatibility issues. It is also cheap -- 1/4th the cost of tin, 1/100th the cost of silver, and 1/10,000th that of gold -- and abundant, and has 10× the electrical and thermal conductivity compared to commercial tin-based solder.

The ATC has demonstrated CuantumFuse with the assembly of a small test camera board. Some technical challenges still have to be addressed, such as improving bond strength, before the solder paste is ready for military and commercial applications, acknowledged Mike Beck, director of the Advanced Materials and Nanosystems group at the ATC.
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Melting point of lead-free solder reduced 11°C by nanoalloying Sb-Sn with nickel

Melting point of lead-free solder reduced 11°C by nanoalloying Sb-Sn with nickel:


The University of Vienna, Austria, announces that a research program has resulted in a reduction in melting point of up to 11°C in tin-antimony based solder with nickel additions by using nanoalloys prepared by a chemical reduction method. Chemical precursors were prepared by precipitation reactions, followed by thermal decomposition,  and the reaction conditions were optimized. Particle size was modified to be in the range of 50 to 150 nm, which would translate into a size-dependent lowering of soldering temperature in any practical application.

With the  reduction of the grain size into the nanometer range and a corresponding lowering of the melting temperature, considerable energy savings would become possible in the first soldering step without sacrificing the stability of the  solder junctions against re-melting in the further assembling procedure.

Special emphasis was placed on Sn-rich compositions that were assumed to be of particular importance for soldering purposes. Standard methods such as powder X-ray diffraction, electron probe micro-analysis, scanning electron microscopy, and differential thermal analysis were used to clarify the phase relations in the ternary Sn-Sb-Ni system. The team used the "Computer coupling of phase diagrams and thermochemistry" (Calphad) method, enabling the scientists to reliably predict the thermodynamic properties without experimental information.

To refine the phase relations in the Sn-Sb-Ni system, Nanosold used other complementary methods. These included powder X-ray diffraction, electron probe micro-analysis, scanning electron microscopy and differential thermal analysis.

Read the complete release.




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High risk defense suppliers soars, report finds

High risk defense suppliers soars, report finds:

Anne-Françoise PELE

10/31/2012 1:30 PM EDT


PARIS – The number of high risk suppliers to the U.S. government agencies, defense contractors and subcontractors, as well as all military and commercial electronics application markets increased by 63 percent from 2002 to 2011, according to market research firm IHS iSuppli.

In 2011, IHS observed that a total of 9,539 suppliers were reported either for known involvement in high-risk, fraudulent and suspect counterfeit part transactions, or for conduct identified by the government as grounds to debar, suspend or otherwise exclude from contract participation. There were 5,849 in 2002.

In all, IHS reported that 78,217 high risk suppliers to U.S. government had been identified during the period from 2002 to 2011.


Click on image to enlarge

Vicki Knauf, parts logistics expert at IHS, declared: “It’s abundantly clear that supplier risk is real, extensive and growing. It’s a federal acquisition requirement to screen for debarred, suspended or otherwise excluded parties. The Department of Defense, as well as its contractors and subcontractors, must comply with new regulations for the use of trusted suppliers and authorized sources."

"A key component of developing a secure supply chain includes the use of Trusted Suppliers. Pinpointing probabilities of risk, blacklisting and vetting high-risk suppliers are crucial to developing a resilient supply chain that fends off devious behavior," Knauf concluded.

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Combating fake chips by controlling supply chain

Combating fake chips by controlling supply chain:



In December 2011, President Barack Obama signed the fiscal year 2012 US National Defense Authorization Act. The budget bill also encourages the implementation of procedures to mitigate the possibility of obtaining counterfeit components by making members of all tiers of the defense supply chain accountable. The meaning of the term counterfeit in this context includes fake, substandard, damaged, or mismarked components.

In the fall of 2011, for the first time in history, U.S. Federal Courts prosecuted an individual for trafficking in counterfeit integrated circuits, many of which were targeted for the U.S. military. Others were to be used in brake systems in high-speed trains and instruments used by firefighters to detect nuclear radiation. The administrator of the company that sold the components was sentenced to 38 months in prison and assessed fines of $166,141 for selling almost $16 million worth of semiconductors falsely marked as military, commercial or industrial grade.

As progressive as all of this news seems to be in the fight against counterfeit semiconductors making their way into the US supply chain, it is just the beginning. In fact, it is estimated that 2 percent of all the semiconductors sold last year were counterfeit. That doesn’t sound too threatening until we do the math: the estimated value of counterfeit parts that made their way into the U.S. supply chain in 2011 is over $5 billion.

Not only do counterfeit components threaten lives, they impose a vast negative financial impact to semiconductor manufacturers, distributors, electronics equipment manufacturers and end users. It is estimated that the actual cost of a failed semiconductor that makes its way into production – in any industry – can be more than 100 times the cost of the original component. That makes the bargain price – often 70 percent less than the “real thing” – look less and less attractive. No matter how hard the industry tries, it can’t get around that old adage: you get what you pay for.



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